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BRYAN

Cert. to Minn SC
(Yetka; en bane)

v.
ITASCA COUNTY,
MINNESOTA

1.

SUMMARY:

State/Civil

The question presented is whether Minnesota is

--------

empowered by Congress to impose a personal property tax on a mobile

-

home owned by a Chippewa Indian and situated upon Indian land held

~,~ [ !:/The previous memo, concluding that the petn was jurisdictionally

~~.~~~
~ ~~

/,r

v

Timely

untimel~drawn. The clerk's office has verified that the
Minn SC's judgment was not entered until April 10, 1975, which date
brings the petn, filed July 7, within the 90-day period. That the
opinion was dated March 28 does not control.

(

-2-

in trust by the U.S. for the tribe.

Affirming the trial court,

the Minn. SC upheld the tax as authorized by Congress.
2.

FACTS:

Petr, an enrolled member of the Chippewa Tribe,

organized and recognized as such under federal law, has since
1971 owned and resided in a mobile home located within the Greater
Leech Lake Indian Reservation, which land is held jn trust by the
U.S. for the tribe.

The mobile home is permanently connected to

water, sewer, and electric service.

Resp's treasurer assessed

personal property taxes against petr upon the mobile home for
part of 1971 and all of 1972, totalling some $150.

Petr's state

declaratory judgment action asserted tax immunity under federal
Indian law.

The trial court, upon stipulated facts

(including

that the mobile home was personalty),found that the authority to

--- - - - - - - -

tax Indian personalty was extended by Congress to Minnesota
----~-----

its subdivisions) by Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 4
codified

at E" s ~ c.

§

13 0

(and

.....,.~

(Aug. 15, 1953),

subsectjon (a) of which states

that "those civil laws [of the listed States, includjng Minnesota]
that are of general application to private persons or private
property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
I

country as they have elsewhere within the [listed States]."
The Minn. SC

y

(Yetka; en bane), affirming, reasoned that P.L. 280's

~

1/Pub. L. 280, §§ 2 and 4 respectively, grant crjminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indian adjudication to state courts; § 2 is
codified at 18 u.s.c. § 1162. The entire act is reproduced and
attached.

·~;

..
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extension to the named States of criminal and civil jurisdiction
over Indian adjudication, together with the explicit language
quoted above, constituted the first,

important step in Congress'

plan to "assimilate" Indians into modern society, a reading
supported by the legislative history.

The quoted language should

thus be read as plainly embracing general taxing power over
Indians and Indian property and enterprises within the reservation;
and it is the kind of "express" statutory authorjty required under
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171, 177-179 (1973),
and there found wanting.

That the quoted language within § 1360 (a)

is a general grant of taxing power is confirmed by the excepting
language of§ 1360(b):
"Nothing in this section shall authorize the
alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any
real or personal property, includjng water
rights, belonging to any Indian tribe, band,
or community that is held in trust by the
United States or is subject to a restriction
against alienation imposed by the United
States. .
..
Section 1360(a) must include the general power to tax, for other~

wise§ 1360(b) is

superfluous as a limitation on a non-existent

power.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Within the "backdrop" of the Indian

sovereignty doctrine, McClanahan, 411 U.S., at 172, express
Congressional authority for Minn. to tax Indians on Indian land
does not exist:

(1) the treaty creating the Leech Lake reservation

-4for the Chippewa is silent with respect to taxation;

(2) the Buck

Act, passed six years earlier in 1947, expressly stated that it
was not to be read as authorizing taxation of "any Indian not
otherwise taxed," 4 U.S.C. § 109, which language js "explicable
only if Congress assumed that the States lacked the power to
impose • • • taxes without special authorization." McClanahan,
no
411 u.s., at 177; (3) there is/express grant of taxjng power jn ·
either the language of P.L. 280 or its legislative history; that
immunity which Congress so carefully preserved in prjor statutes
like the Buck Act would not have been swept aside without specjfic

(':::::1

notation;

(4) P.L. 280, according to its legislative h:i story, is

to be read as a "law and order" statute, designed to shift
responsibility for adjudication from tribal courts to state courts;

it is a modest solution to the specific problem of the inadequacy
of law enforcement in some areas of Indian country.

Finally, the

question of whether P.L. 280 authorizes the levy of personal
income or property taxes on Indians within reservations was
specifically reserved in McClanahan.
DISCUSSION: The only decision relied upon by Minn. SC
squarely
as/on point is Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters, 382 F.Supp. 421
4.

(D. Neb. 1974).

It has since been affirmed by CA 8. 516 F.2d 133.

Peters involved Nebraska's assertion of taxjng power over the
personal income earned on the reservation by Indians resjding

-5therein.
(a) •

Nebraska, like Minnesota, is a listed state under § 1360

Distinguishing McClanahan on the ground that Arizona does not

come within§ 1360, CA 8's reasoning tracked that of the Minn. SC:
to give "civil laws • • • of general application" the same force
and effect within Indian country is plainly to embrace personal
income tax laws.

That§ 1360(b) granted a specific tax exemption

as to trust property shows Congress' awareness that state revenue
laws were among those which would become applicable to Indians by
virtue of the breadth of§ 1360(a).

516 F.2d at 137.

Petr is correct in stating that McClanahan reserved the very
- namely ;question presented, 411 U.S., at 178, n. 18,/that on the assumption

G

that a state is within the reach of § 1360, does that sectjon
empower taxation of Indians living on the reservation.
not CA 8 and the Minn. SC are correct,
for cert:

Whether or

I would rate this a

candid~te

(1) a decision would have broad applicabiljty to

personalty, income, and other non-trust-property taxes (see petn
Indians
at 23-24) with respect to/living on reservations within the reach
of § 1360;

(2)

since under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968

those tribes not embraced by § 1360 now have the choice

(as

opposed to the states) of subjecting themselves to state civil
and criminal jurisdiction (25 U.S.c. §§ 1321 & 1322), this Court
~

\_ .

.

should settle the tax implications involved in that choice.
There is no response;
8/19/75

it has been waived.

A

L-')cb· JJI/J{J /IUtiJl

Mason

1/:Zc,A1. {.j MJ•f'l~l'
·-:
..::t;.-~ ,cA f#

Minn. SC opin ~etn

c-~~-~

Aucu•1 1!'1, 1953

[H. R, 1063)

P.L. 83-280,
67 Stat. 588
lnd.iona.

Stat • jurjs<Jic•
tion over cnm.Jnal
offenaea.

AN ACT
To ._..i<•r jurisdiction ott tlH• ~tall'~ of Callforuin, ~
.esotu, l'><'llrn~kn, OrP~on.
UIIO "'h<(•onHill, \dill ri' SJI\'('1 to critllllllll o!Tt•IJSI '<' 1111(! ch·iJ !'llii~I'R or U<'llon
contmitt<·u or uri~<ing ou Jnuian n· s<· n·utlon~ within IHH:ll 1->tutcs, und fur
othPr Jturpvs<•s.

Be it rnartrd by tlt e ,<. '. crw ff' w1d llouse of Rrpl'r>Xc11tativ<'!i of the
Vnitu!State« of A111n·iea in Cou_qress assemblr.d, That chapter 53 of
title 18, Unit(•d ·States Code, is herpuy amended by inserting at the
end of tl1e d1apter analysis JH'CCPoing section 1151 of such title tbe
following llew Jtern:
"lJG:.!. StutP jnris<liction on·r ofTenst'S <·vlltlU!tt<·d
lu<linn <'vllntry.''
·

IJ~·

or a;;Jt!ust lndinns in the

SEc. 2. Title 18, United States Code, is ltereby amended by inserting in cltapter 53 tberNf imuwdiately after section llGl a new section,
to ue designated as section 1162, as follows:
"§ 11G:2. State juri.diction over offenses committed by or against
Indians in the Indian country
"(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the
areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the
!:iame extent that such State has juri sdiction over offenses committed
elsewl1ere within the State, and the criminal laws of such State shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they
have elsewhere within the State:
"State of
Indian eonntry nlfl'cted
California ______________ . All Indi11n country within the State
Miunesotll _______________ All Indinn country within the State, except the Red
I.11ke Rescn·ntion
NeiJraska _______________ . All Indian country within the State
Oregon------- --- ------- · All Indian country within tiJe State, except tbp V>arm
Springs Heservation
'Wisconsin _______________ All Indian eountry within the Stute, except the
Menominee Reservation

"(b) Nothing in this section shn.ll authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water
rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall
authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any
ref_,rulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any Indian or
any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or
immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with
respect to huntin~, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or
regulation thereot.
"(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall
not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this section."
SEc. 3. Chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is hereby
amended by inserting at the end of the chapter analysis preceding
section 1331 of such title the following new item:
"13GO. Stl!te civil jurisdiction in actions to which Indians nre parties."

SEc. 4. Title 28, United States Code, is hereby a~ended by inserting
in chapter 85 thereof immediately after section 1359 a new section, to
be designated as section 1360, as follows:
"§ 1360. State civil jurisdiction in ·actions to which Indians are
parties
"(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to ·which
Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed
opposite the name of the State to the same extent that such State has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of
such State that are of general application to private persons or private
property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
country as they have elsewhere within the State:
"State or
Intllan country 111fected
California ________ All Indian country within the State
:'lllnnesota ________ All Indian country within the State, except the Hed Lake
HesPrYutlon
:'\chru~ka ________ , All Indian country within the State
Ore~-:on ___________ All Indian <·ountry within the State, exct>pt the Warm Springs
HPsenn t ion
Wisconsin ________ AI~ . ludlau .country within tb<' Stall', ex<'ept th<• Menolllinee

Ta>:ot!on a! property, etc,

State jurlsdic·
tion over civil
causea.

P. L. 280 (cont.)

"(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or t:.lXation of any real or perso nal propertY., including water
rights, belonging to any Indian or any I!l(lian tnbe, band, or community that is h eld in trust hy the United States or is subject to a
r.:>striction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall
authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any
regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon
the State to adjudJcaLc, in probate proceed ings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.
"(c) Any tribal ordinn.nce or custom heretofore or hereafter
adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any
authority which it may possess shall, if not incon s iste nt with any
applicable civil law of the State, be given full force and effect in the
determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section."
Repeal.

Rem oval of legal
impediment.

Consent of U. S,
to other States.

Toxationofprot>""
erty, etc.

SEc. fi. Section 1 of tlH• Act of OctoLer fl. Hl4!) (U:-l Stat. 70f,, ch.
G04). is hereby re1wal.:>d, but sucl1 repeal sl1all not affec:t any proceedings heretofore instituted 1111<ler that section.
SEC. u. Notwithstanding the proYisions of any EnaLling Act for the
admission of a State, th.:> eonsent of il1e United States is hen•by :.rinn
to the people of any State to amend, where necessa ry, their State constitution or .:>xisting statutes, as the casC' may be, to remon any h·:.ral
impe<lim.:>nt to the assumption of ei,•il and criminal juris<lirtion in
atconlanc.:> \Yith the provisio11S of this Act: PTo1'i.ded. That the proYisions of this Act shall not h<'com.:> effective with resp<'ct to surh
assumption of juri sd iction by any su('h State until the people thereof
have appropriately amended tlteir State constitution or statutes as
the case may be.
SEC. 7. The consent of the United States is hereby given to any
other State not ha\'ing jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses
or civil cau ses of action, or with respect to Loth, as provided for in
this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such ti111e and in such manner as
the people of the State shall, by affirmative le;.rislative action, oLligate
and bind the State to assumption then·of.
Approved August 15, 1953.

28 USCA §1323 (Supp. 1975):
§ 1323. Retrocession or jurisdiction by State
(a) The United States is authorized to accept a retrocession by any
State of all or any mE'asure of the criminal or civil jurisdiction, or both,
acquired by such State pursuant to the provisions of section 1162 of Title
18, section 1360 of Title 28, or section 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67
StaL 58&), as It was In effect prior to Its rE'peal by subsection (b) of
this section.
(b) Section 7 o! the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588). Is hereby
repealed, but such repeal shall not affect any cession of jurisdiction made
pursuant to such section prior to Its repeal.
Pub.L. 90-28{, Title IV, § 403, Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79.

:~ ·

note repeal
c-of P.L. 280,

§7.

··,:1

~~~~~
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BENCH MEMO

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Carl Schenker
No. 75-5027

DATE:

April 17, 1976

Bryan v. Itasca County

I recommend reversal.
This is a you-pays-your-money-and-you-takes-your-choice
case.

I choose the Indians.
Basic "Indian law" is that states may not tax Indians

without congressional authorization.

If there is such

authorization here, Congress gave it in an off-hand fashion.
It seems to me more likely that the Indians are correct in
contending that Congress intended only (i) to confer state
court jurisdiction to resolve civil disputes, and (ii) to
designate a choice-of-law principle.

Congress probably was

not aware of how carefully it might have to draw a protective
clause because of the ill-developed state of Indian tax law
in 1957.

I am somewhat confirmed in my view by the state's

argument consisting of nothing but "plain language" points.

Carl
ss

c.,r. .J.o IV~ ¥l:.f-

75-5027

6).

BRYAN v. ITASCA COUNTY

Argued 4/20/76
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JUSTICE W M. J . BRENNAN . J R .

J une 1 , 1976
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MEMORNADUM TO THE CONFERENCE

...
RE : No. 75-5027

Bryan v . Itasca Co,

Due to the log-jam at pr i nt shop I circulate
above in xeroxed form.
... .....

'•.

W. J.B . Jr.

...

J
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RUSSELL B~AN, petitioner v. ITASCA CO'trf"..JTY, MINNESOTA,
respondent
O N PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF MINNESOTA
D ecided June __ , 1976

No. 75-5027

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
T his case presents the question reserved in McClanahan v.
A r i zona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S . 164, 178 n. 18 (1973):
whether the grant of civil jurisdiction to the States conferred by § 4
ofP u b licLaw280, 72Stat59 0 , 28U.S.C . § 1360, isaCongress io nal grant of power to the States to tax reservation Indians except
i nsofar as taxation is expressly excluded by the terms of the statute.
Petitioner Russell Bryan, an enrolled member of the

1_/
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe,

resides in a mobile home on land held

...

7"'

-

in trust for the Chippewa Tribe on the Leech Lake Reservation in

..

-

Minnesota.

In June of 1972, petitioner received notices from the

auditor of respondent Itasca County, Minnesota that he had been
assessed personal property tax liability on the mobile home totaling
$14 7 . 95 .

Thereafter, in September, 1972, petitioner brought this

s uit in the Minnesota District Court seeking a declaratory judgment
that the state and county were without authority to levy such a tax on
p ersonal property of a reservation Indian on the reservation and that
i mposition of such a tax was contrary to federal law.

The Minnesota

District Court rejected the contention and entered judgment for

- 2 -

respondent County.

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed,

Minn. _ _ , 228 N. W. 2d 249 (1975).

u.s.

F

We granted certiorari,

(1975), and now reverse.

I

Principles defining the power of States to tax reservation
"

I

Indians and their property and activities on federally established
.•

reservations were codified in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).

As summarized in its companion

case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973),
McClanahan established the principle that:
"[I]n the special area of state taxation absent cession
of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it,
there has been ll£.Satisfactory autho:_ity for t~ing
Indian reservation 1ands or Tnd'ian inCome from activities carried on within'1Ii';"'5oundaires o"I the reservation, and McClanahan . . . lays to rest any doubt in
this respect by holding that such taxation is not
permissible absent Congressional consent. " Mes calera
Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 148. ?:...!
McClanahan held that Arizona was dis a bled in the absence of Congres sional consent from imposing a state income tax on the income of a
reservation Indian earned solely on the reservation.

On the authority

of McClanahan, Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,

u.s.

__,

( 1976), held this Term that in the absence of Congres-

sional consent the State was disabled from imposing a personal property

- 3 -

.

'"

tax on motor vehicles owned by tribal members living on the

,,
<
''

reservation, or a vendor license fee applied to a reservation
b-·.1

Indian conducting a business for the Tribe on reservation land,
or a sales tax as applied to on-reservation sales by Indians to
Indians.
Thus McClanahan and Moe preclude any authority in respondent
County to levy a personal property tax upon petitioner's mobile home
in the absence of Congressional consent.

Our task therefore is to
,'

..

determine whether § 4 of Public Law 280, 28 U.S. C. § 1360, constitutes such consent.
Subsection (a) of§ 4, 28 U.S. C. § 1360(a), provides:
"Each of the States . . . listed . . . shall have
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between
Indians or to which Indians are parties which
arise in the areas of Indian country listed . . •
to the same extent that such State . . . has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those
civil laws of such State . . . that are of general
application to private persons or private property
shall have the same force and effect within Indian
country as they have elsewhere within the State . .

-~,·

~·,;'·~ ~

..

~·
.,

..?':..:

·t{.

....,

~

....... .

~

.

~·;

..-..•''
~

~·:r

Minnesota

The

st~~=.te

All Indian Country within the ::;tate,
except the Red Lake Reservation"

-

does not in terms provide that the tax laws of a State are

-

-

among "civil laws . . . of general application to private persons or
private property." The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded, however,
'··r

)0

-~.

t

. l
...

•

t._,~

·~

..

•

- 4 -

--

that they were included, finding in § 4(b) of the statute a negative

-

implication of inclusion in § 4(a) of a general power of tax.
A

,__,

~

..__---...._...

CUI

Section

4

4(b) provides:
"Nothing in this section shall authorize the
alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real
or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community that is held in trust by the United States
or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or
statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto;
or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the
ownership or right to possession of such property or
any interest therein. 11
The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that "unless paragraph (a) is
interpreted as a general power to tax, the exceptions contained in
paragraph (b) are limitations on a non-existent power." _ _ Minn.,

'}_/
at _ _, 228 N. W. 2d, at

Therefore, the State Court held

"Public Law 280 is a clear grant of power to tax," _ _ Minn., at

_!lj
_ _ , 228 N. W. 2d, at

___

We disagree.

-

That conclusion is fore-

closed by
....,,._.the legislative history of Public Law 280 and the application
=-" ,_....

--

of canons of construction applicable to Congressional statutes claitned
to terminate Indian immunities.

II
.•.

The primary concern of Congress in enacting Public Law 280
that clearly emerges from its sparse legislative history was with the
problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the
absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement.
Goldberg, Public Law 280:

See

The Limits of State Jurisdiction over

Reservation Indians, 22 U. C. L.A. L. Rev. 535, 541-542 (1975).

The

House Report expressly states:
11

Thes e States lack jurisdiction to prosecute Indians
for most offenses committed on Indian reservations or
other Indian country, with limited exceptions. The
applicability of Federal criminal laws in States having
Indian reservations is also limited. The United States
district courts have a measure of jurisdiction over
offenses comrnitted on Indian reservations or other
Indian country by or against Indians, but in cases of
offenses committed by Indians against Indians that jurisdiction is limited to the so-called 10 major crimes:
murder, manslau ghter, rape, incest, assault with intent
to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary,
robbery, and larceny.

,-

,,

~

.,

11

As a practical matter, the enforcement of law and
order among the Indians in the Indian country has been
left largely to the Indian groups themselves. In many
States, tribes are not adequately organized to perform.
that function; consequently, there has been created a
hiatus in law-enforcement authority that could best be
remedied by conferring criminal jurisdiction on States
indicating an ability and willingness to accept such responsibility. II

,,

..' "
'

;.

'

'}_I
H. R. Rep. 848, 8 3d Cong. , 1st Ses s. 5-6 ( 195 3).

Thus, provision

for State criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against
•• ,"¥•

.

.

•,,
J

.·
..,

,,

.
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\

Indians on the reservations was the central focus of Public Law 280

fl.. I
and is embodied in§ 2 oftheAct, 18 U.S.C. § 1162.

. ..

.
~·

In marked contrast is the virtual

'

..

~~

~_t'

sional policy or intent in the legislative history respecting § 4' s grant
of civil jurisdiction to the States.

:.

~

-~"

Of special significance for our pur-

,,

poses, however, is the total absence of any mention or discussion

'-·~

regarding a Congressional intent to confer upon the States an authority

'

•''

··_;.:

to tax Indians or Indian property on Indian reservations.

Neither

7_1
Report nor floor discussion in either House mentions such authority.
This omission has significance in the application of the canons of construction applicable to statutes affecting Indian immunities, as some
mention would normally be expected if such a sweeping change in the
.,

status of tribal government and reservation Indians had been contem~/

plated by Congress.

The only mention of taxation authority is in a

colloquy between Mr. Sellery, Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and Congressman Young during House committee hearings
on Public Law 280.

That colloquy strongly suggests that Congress did

not mean to grant tax authority to the States:
"Mr. Young. Does your bill limit the provision for
Federal assistance to States in defraying the increased
expenses of the courts in connection with the widening
of the jurisdiction that the bill encompasses?
Mr. Sellery. No; it does not.
Mr. Young. Do you think it would be necessary to
provide for some payment, inasmuch as the great portion of Indian lands are not subject to taxation?

. '·

..
··-

.
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Mr. Sellery. . . . Generally, the Department's
views are that if we started on the processes of
Federal financial assistance or subsidization of law
enforcement activities among the Indians, it might
turn out to be a rather costly program, and it is a
problem which the States should deal with and accept
without Federal financial assistance; otherwise there
will be some tendency, the Department believes, for
the Indian to be thought of and perhaps to think of
himself because of the financial assistance which
comes from the Federal Government as still somewhat
a member of a race or group which is set apart from
other citizens of the State. And it is desired to give
him and the other citizens of the State the feeling of a
conviction that he is in the same status and has access
to the same services, including the courts, as other
citizens of the State who are not Indians.
Mr. Young. That would not quite be true, though;
would it? Because for the most part he does not pay
any taxes.
Mr. Sellery. No. There is that difference.
Mr. Young. A rather sizable difference in not paying for the courts or paying for the increased expenses
for judicial proceedings.
Mr. Sellery. The Indians, of course, do pay other
forms of taxes. I do not know how the courts of Nevada
are supported financially, but the Indians do pay the
sales tax and other taxes.
Mr. Young. But no income tax or corporation tax
or profits tax. You understand a large portion of the
land is held in trust and therefore is not subject to tax.
Mr. Sellery. That is correct.
Mr. Young. So far as my State is concerned, it
would be a large burden on existing costs of judicial
procedure. I think it is only right that the Federal
Government should make some contribution for that.
You seem to differentiate. I think there is a differentiation, too, in that they are not paying taxes.
Mr. Sellery. I will concede your point that they are
not paying taxes. The Department has recomm.ended,
nevertheless, that no financial assistance be afforded to
the States." App. 55-56. 2_/

.~

."·

I

'

..'

.

~.~. ·

·····.·<

' ..

'

..
,.,

,.,\

•

<
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Piecing together as best we can the

sparse legislative

'

history of § 4, subsection (a) seems to have been primarily intended
to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private
legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and
other private citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to decide
such disputes; this is definitely the import of the statutory wordin g
conferring upon a State

11

jurisdiction over civil causes of action be-

,..

•I

tween Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in . . .
Indian country . . . to the same extent that such State . . . has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action.

11

With this as the pri-

mary focus of§ 4(a), the wording that follows in§ 4(a) --

11

and those

civil laws of such State . . . that are of general application to private
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect
within Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State 11

--

authorizes application by the State courts of their rules of decision to

lQ.I
decide such disputes.

Compare 28 U.S. C. § 1652.

U)

Th~s

canst rue -

tion *nds support in the consistent and uncontradicted references in
the legislative history to

11

.~

'

permitting State courts to adjudicate civil

controversies'' arising on Indian reservations, H. R. Rep. 848, at
5, 6 (emphasis added), and the complete absence of anything remotely
resembling an intention to confer general state civil regulatory control
over Indian reservations.

.!.1./

In short, the consistent and exclusiv e

'.
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use of the terms "civil cause of action," "arising in," "civil laws
of general application to private persons and private property,

11

and

"adjudica t[ion), " in both the Act and its legislative history virtually
compel our conclusion that the primary intent was to grant juris~.

diction over litigation involving reservation Indians in state court.
Furthermore, certain tribal reservations were completely
exempted from the provisions of Public Law 280 precisely becaus e
each had a "tribal law-and-order organization that functions in a

]1_/
reasonably satisfactory manner." H. R. Rep. 848, at 7.

Con gress

plainly meant only to allow state courts to decide criminal and cidl

·'

matters arising on reservations not so organized.

./\.

Accordingly,

rather than the expansive reading given § 4(a) by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, the construction we give the section is much more
consonant with the revealed congressional intent:.

Moreover, our

..

construction is consistent with our prior references to § 4 as "the
extension of state jurisdiction over causes of action arising in Indi an

'

•

country." Kennerly v . District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 427
(1971).

See also, id., at 424 n. 1; id., at 430-432 (STEWART, J.,

dissentin g); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm., 380
U.S. 685,687, n. 3(1965);MenomineeTribcv. U.S., 391U.S. 404,
,_.

416, n. 8 ( 1968) (STEW ART , J. , dissenting).

Our construction is

also fully consistent with Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,

,..

'
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25 U.S. C. §§ 1321-1326.

Title IV repeals§ 7 of Public Law 280

and requires tribal consent as a condition to further state assumptions of the jurisdiction provided in 18 U.S. C. § 1162 and 28 U.S. C.
§ 1360.

...

Section 402 of Title IV, 25 U.S. C. § 1322, tracks verbatim

the language of § 4 of Public Law 280.

Section 406 of Title IV, 25

U.S. C. § 1326, which provides for Indian consent, refers to "State

,

.

.,.

·,.l..

jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter with respect to
criminal offenses or civil causes of action • . . .

11

It is true, of

course, that the primary interpretation of § 4 must have reference
to the legislative history of the Congress that enacted it rather than
to the history of Acts of a later Congress.

Nevertheless, Title IV

of the 1968 Act is intimately related to § 4, as it provides the method
for further state assumptions of the jurisdiction conferred by § 4.
We have construed the effect of legislation affecting reservation
Indians in light of "intervening" legislative enactments, Moe v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenaj Tribes,

U.S., at _ _, and it

would be paradoxical to suppose that Congress intended the meaning
of § 4 to vary depending upon the time and method by which particular
States acquired jurisdiction.

Certainly the legislative history of

Title IV makes it difficult to construe § 4 jurisdiction acquired pursuant to Title IV as extending State general civil regulatory po\ver,
including taxing power, to govern Indian reservations.

Senator Ervin,

.•"

- 11 -

who offered and principally sponsored Title IV, see Kennerly v.

.....

District Court of Montana, 400 U.S., at 42 9 n. 5, referred to § 1360

"

civil jurisdiction as follows:
"Certainly representatives of municipalities
have charged that the repeal of Public Law 280
would hamper air and water pollution controls and
provide a haven for undesirable, unrestricted
business establishments within tribal land borders.
Not only does this assertion show the lack of faith
that certain cities have in the ability and desire of
Indian tribes to better themselves and their environment, but, 1nost importantly, it is irrelevant, since
Public Law 280 relates primarily to the application
of state civil and criminal law in court proceedings,
and has no bearing on programs set up by the States
to assist economic and environmental development
in Indian territory. 11 (emphasis added)

·'

•''...,

III
Other considerations also support our construction.

Today' s

Congressional policy toward reservation Indians may less clearly than

.

in 1953 favor their assimilation but Public Law 280 was plainly not
meant to effect total assimilation.

Public Law 280 was only one of

'

'

....,

r

<·

many types of assimilationist legislation under active consideration
in 1953.

H. R. Rep. 848, at 3-5; Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kin g s

D..I
County, No. 74-1565, Slip op. at 10 (CA 9, Nov. 3, 1973).

And

.,

nothing in its legislative history remotely suggests that Congress meant
the Act's extension of civil jurisdiction to the States should result in the
undermining or destruction of such tribal governments as did exist and ·

.

'•'•-

I·

'·

'

•
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a conversion of the affected tribes into little more than "'private,

.;,

voluntary organizations, "' United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,
557 (1975) -subordinated to the full panoply of civil regulatory powers, including

.!±I
taxation, of state and local governments.
such an inference:

The Act itself refutes

there is notably absent any conferral of state

,.
,,.

jurisdiction over the tribes themselves, and § 4(c), 28 U.S. C.

§ 1360(c), providing for the "full force and effect" of any tribal ordinances or customs "heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian
tribe . . . if not inconsistent with any applicable law of the State"

]2_/
contemplates the continuing vitality of tribal government.
Moreover, the same Congress that enacted Public Law 280

}J:_/
also enacted several tennination Acts,

legislation which is cogent

proof that Congress knows well how directly to express its intent
when that intent is to subject Indians to the full sweep of state laws
and state taxation.

Cf. Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S.

705, 713 (1943); Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 149 (1906).

These

termination enactments provide expressly for subjecting distributed
property "and any income derived therefrom by the individual, corporation or other legal entity, to the same taxes, state and federal, as in
the case of non-Indians," 25 U.S. C. § 564j; 25 U.S. C. § 749; 25 U.S. C.

§ 898, and provide that "all statutes of the United States which affect

,'
- 13 -

Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable
to members of the tribe, and the laws of the several states shall apply
to the tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply to other
citizens or persons within their jurisdiction.

11

25 U.S. C. § 564q;

25 U.S. C. § 757; 25 U.S. C. § 899; cf., 25 U.S. C. § 726.

These con-

temporaneous termination Acts are in pari materia with Public Law
280.

Menominee Tribe v. United States, 3 91 U.S. , at 411.

Readin g

this express language respecting state taxation and application of the

..•

full range of state laws to tribal members of these contemporaneous
termination Acts, the negative inference is that Congress did not mean
in section 4(a) to subject reservation Indians to state taxation.

Thus

..,.·

rather than the negative implication, found by the Minnesota Supreme

-·

Court in the exclusion of certain taxation by § 4(b), of a grant of
general taxing power in § 4(a), we conclude that these Acts in pari

,.

'

materia with Public Law 280 show that if Congress in enacting Public

-..:!

!

Law 280 had intended to confer upon the States general civil regulatory
powers, including taxation, over reservation Indians, it would have

)'

f.

expressly said so.

IV

)J

Additionally, we note that § 4(b), excluding
any real or personal property

11

taxation . . . of

belonging to any Indian or Indian

}
~·

,.-
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tribe . . . that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to
a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States," is
not obviously the narrow exclusion of state taxation which the
.\

Minnesota Supreme Court read it to be.

On its face the statute i s

not clear whether the exclusion is applicable only to taxes levied
directly on the trust property specifically, or whether it also excludes
~.

taxation on activities taking place in conjunction with such property
and income deriving from its use.

And even if read narrowly to apply

'··

only to taxation levied against trust property directly, § 4(b) certainly
does not expressly authorize all other state taxation of reservation
Indians.
Moreover, the express prohibition of any "alienation, encumbrance, or taxation" of any trust property can be read as a prohibition
on the state courts acquiring jurisdiction over civil controversies in-

•.

volving reservation Indians pursuant to § 4, from applying state la\vs
or enforcing judgments in ways that would effectively result in the
11

alienation, encumbrance, or taxation" of trust property.

Indeed, any

other reading of this provision of § 4(b) is difficult to square with the
identical prohibition contained in § 2 (b) of the Act, which applies the
same restrictions upon state courts exercising criminal jurisdiction
over reservation Indians.

'.

It would silnply make no sense to infer from.

the identical language of § 2 (b) a general power in § 2 (a) to tax Indians
in all other respects since § 2 (a) deals only with criminal jurisdiction.

'•·
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Indeed, § 4(b) in its entirety may be read as simply a
reaffirmation of the existing reservation Indian-Federal Government
relationship in all respects save the conferral of state court jurisdiction to adjudicate private civil causes of action involving Indians.
We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that § 4(b) is
" entirely consistent with, and in effect is a reaffirmation of, the law
a s it stood prior to its enactment.
8 63, 865-866 (1957).

11

Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F. 2d

The absence of more precise language respect-

i ng state taxation of reservation Indians is entirely consistent with a
general uncertainty in 1953 of the precise status and limits of state
p ower to tax reservation Indians respecting other than their trust
property, and a congressional intent merely to reaffirm the existing

J:.Jj
l aw whatever subsequent litigation might determine it to be.
Finally, in construing this "admittedly ambiguous statute,

11

Board of County Comm 1 rs v. Seber, 318 U.S., at 713, we must be
guided by that "eminently sound and vital canon,

11

Northern Cheyenne

Tribe v . Hollo'v\' breast, _ _ U.S. _ _ , _ _ n. 7 (1976), that "statutes
pas sed for the benefit of Indian tribes are to be liberally construed,
doubtful expressions being resolved in their favor.

11

Alaska Pacific
·I

Fisheries v. United States, 78, 89 (1918).

See Choate v. Trapp, 224

U. S . 665, 675 (1912); Antojne v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 -2 00
('

(1975 ) .

This principle of statutory construction has particular force

.,.
'
t·.,.
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in the face of claims that ambiguous statutes abolish by implication
Indian tax immunities.

',..

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm' n,

411 U.S., at 174; Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956);
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366-367 (1930).
cause

This is so be-

....'

Indians stand in a special relationship to the federal

government from which the states are excluded unless the Congress
has manifested a clear purpose to terminate [a tax] immunity and allow
states to treat Indians as part of the general community." Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 613-614 (1943) (Murphy,
J., dissenting).

What we recently said of a claim that Congress had

terminated an Indian reservation by means of an ambiguous statute is
.~

...

equally applicable here to the respondent's claim that § 4(a) of Public
Law 280 is a "clear grant of power to tax," and hence a termination of
traditional Indian imm.unity from state taxation:
'"

"Congress was fully aware of the means by which
termination could be effected. But clear termination
language \\' as not employed in the . . . Act. This
being so, we are not inclined to infer an intention to
terminate . . . . A congressional determination to
terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or
be clear from the surrounding circumstances and
legislative history." Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,
504-505 (1973).
The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is
reversed.

'•

No. 75-502 7 .._/

FOOTNOTES

The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is a federally recognized
tribe with a constitution approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 2 n. 2.
Its reservation was established by the Treaty of February 22, 1855,
10 Stat. 1165.

?:..I
The McClanahan principle derives from general preemption
analysis, 411 U.S. , at 172, that gives effect to the plenary and exelusive power of the federal government to deal with Indian tribes,

..

',

'•

United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554 n. 11 ( 1975); Morton v .
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-552 (1974); Board of County Comm'rs v .

··.

"... "''

Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 716 (1943), and to "regulate and protect Indians
and their property against interference even by a state," Board of
County Comm' rs v. Seber, supra, at 715.

This preemption analysis

· draws support from the '"backdrop' of the Indian sovereignty
doctrine, " Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,

__

,

u.s.

( 1976), '"the policy of leaving Indians free from state juris-

diction and control [which] is deeply rooted in the nation's history,"'
McClanahan, supra, at 168, and the extensive federal legislative and
administrative regulation of Indian tribes and reservations, id., at
173-179.

"Congress has . . . acted consistently on the assumption

• t

''

..,, ...
'•'

-·

~.

FN- 2

that the states have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a

~

,,....

...

•:I'.

:·•

reservation,

11

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959), and
~-

therefore

111

.....

state laws generally are not applicable on an Indian

reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that St ate

I~

laws shall apply. '" McClanahan, supra, at 170-171 (quoting U.S.
Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 ( 1958)).
Of course, this preemption model usually yields different conelusions as to the application of state laws to tribal Indians who have
left or never inhabited federally established reservations, or Indians
"who do not possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-government,

I,.

11

·'·

McClanahan, supra, at 167-168; see Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra,
at 148-149.

·.,... ·
The State Supreme Court relied upon Oma h a Tribe of Indi ans

.·., ..

~

v. Peters, 382 F. Supp. 421, aff'd 516 F. 2d 133 (8th Cir.), v/here the
Di strict Court for the District of Nebraska gave the same construc tion
to Public Law 280 in upholding a state income tax levi ed against re ser-

·•·

vation Indian income.

.-/'

Petitioner had not properly raised a claim that his mobile
home was in fact annexed to tribal trust land and therefore a part of
the real property expressly excluded from taxation by § 4(b) .

The

'·

.•'
~

FN- 3

Minnesota Supreme Court found, however, that the mobile home was
personal property taxable as such under Minnesota law.

''

§_I
The House Report, H. R. Rep. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
( 1953), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. 699, 83d Cong. , 1st Ses s.
(1953), are in all material respects identical.

All citations herein

are to the House Report.

~I
Section 2 of Public Law 280, 18 U.S. C. § 1162, provides:
"State jurisdiction over offenses committed
by or against Indians in the Indian country.
(a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the
following table shall have jurisdiction over offenses
committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian
country listed opposite the name of the State or Territory to the same extent that such State or Territory has
jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within
the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such
State or Territory shall have the same force and effect
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within
the State or Territory:
State or
Territory of

.,;,

.~

Indian country affected

Minnesota------- All Indian country within the State,
except the Red Lake Reservation.

(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the
alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or
personal property, including water rights, belonging

..,.

..{.
'

J

'\

..
'

~

,.
~

..

.......

,

FN- 4

to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community that is held in trust by the United
States or is subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States; or
shall authorize regulation of the use of such
property in a manner inconsistent with any
Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with
any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall
deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band,
or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting,
trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing,
or regulation thereof.
(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and
1153 of this chapter shall not be applicable
within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this section as areas over which
the several States have exclusive jurisdiction. 11

·"

]_I
99 Gong. Rec. 9962, 10782, 10928 (1953).

§_/
See Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty
and Economic Development, 49 N.D. L. Rev. 267, 292 (1973).

Jj
Unpublished Transcript of Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
83d Gong., lst Sess. (1953).

The transcript was produced by the

United States during the briefing of Tonasket v. Washin gton, 411 U.S.
451 (1973).

The portion quoted in the text is reproduced in the Appendix

in the instant cas e.

·.

FN- 4

to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community that is held in trust by the United
States or is subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States; or
shall authorize regulation of the use of such
property in a manner inconsistent with any
Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with
any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall
deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band,
or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting,
trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing,
or regulation thereof.
(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and
1153 of this chapter shall not be applicable
within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this section as areas over which
the several States have exclusive jurisdiction. 11

,.'

J_/
99 Gong. Rec. 9962, 10782, 10928 (1953).

'§_I
See Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty
and Economic Development, 49 N.D. L. Rev. 267, 292 (1973).

Unpublished Transcript of Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
83d Gong., 1st Sess. (1953).

The transcript was produced by the

United States during the briefing of Tonasket v. Washington, 411 U.S.
451 (1973).

The portion quoted in the text is reproduced in the Appendix

in the instant case.
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,,.

FN

5

.!.Q_/
Cf. , Israel & Smithson, supra note _ _ , at 2 96:
"A fair reading of these two clauses suggests that
Congress never intended 'civil laws' to mean the entire
array of state non-criminal laws, but rather that
Congress intended 'civil laws' to mean those laws which
have to do with private rights and status, Therefore,
'civil laws . , , of general application to private persons
or private property' would include the laws of contract,
tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, descent, etc. , but
would not include laws declaring or implementing the
states' sovereign powers, such as the power to tax, grant
franchises, etc. These are not within the fair meaning
of 'private' laws."

.!.!_/
Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with the title
of Public Law 280:

"A bill to confer jurisdiction on the States . . , ,

with respect to criminal offenses and civil causes of action committed
or arising on Indian reservations within such states, and for other
purposes" (the other purposes being § 5' s withdrawal from the affected
areas of the operation of the Federal Indian Liquor Laws, and § § 6-7's
provision of a method whereby additional States could assume civil and
criminal jurisdictions over Indian reservations).

Additionally, this

interpretation is buttressed by § 4(c), which provides that "any tribal
ordinance or custom , . . adopted by an Indian tribe . . . in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with
any applicable civil law of the state, be given full force and effect in the
determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section" (emphasis

""

FN- 6

Finally, reading § 4(a) as an integrated whole, with the

added).

reference to state civil law as intended to provide the rules of
decision for the private civil causes of action over which state courts
were granted jurisdiction is consistent with § 3 of Public Law 280,
which codifies § 4 in Title 28 of the United States Code.

That Title

collects acts of Congress governing jurisdiction and the judiciary.
Section 4 would be expected to be codified in Title 25, governing
Indian affairs if general state regulatory power over Indian reservations were being granted.

Indeed, § 4 is entitled, as provided in

Public Law 280 and codified at 28 U.S. C. § 1360, "State jurisdiction
in actions to which Indians are parties.

..,

11

~-

Tribal groups in the affected states which were exempted

.·

from the coverage of Public Law 280 because they had "reasonably
•:'

satisfactory law -and-order 11 organizations, had objected to the ext en-

.,.

sion of state criminal and civil jurisdiction on various grounds.

•...

Three

.

of the tribes exempted objected due to their fear of inequitable treatment of reservation Indians in state courts.

H. R. Rep. 848, at 7-8.

Two of the objecting tribes expressed the fear that

11

the extension of

state law to their reservations would result in the loss of various
rights.
were

11

11

Id., at 8.

One tribe objected on the ground that its members

not yet ready to be subjected to State laws.

11

Ibid.

Certainly if

.~

...

~·

'

'

FN- 7

abolition of traditional Indian immunity from state taxation, except
insofar as expressly excluded, was an anticipated result of Public
Law 280 1 s extension of civil jurisdiction, vehement Indian objections
on this specific ground would also have been voiced.

The legislative history of Public Act 280 does contain a
congressional expression that "the Indians of several states have

....

reached a stage of acculturation and deyelopment that makes desirable
the extension of State civil jurisdiction to the Indian country.
Rep. 848, at 6.

H. R.

But not too much can be made of this unelaborated

statement; its thrust is too difficult to reconcile with the focus of
Public Law 280 -- extending state jurisdiction to those reservations
with the least developed and most inadequate tribal legal institutions;
presumably those tribes evincing the least "acculturation and development 11 in terms of the mainstream of American society.

See Goldberg,
'-

Public Law 280:

The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation

Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 535, 543 (1975).

Much has been written on the subject of a possible devastating

·.

r.

effect on tribal governments that might result from an interpretation of

§ 4 as conferring upon state and local governments general civil regulatory control over reservations Indians.

Santa Rosa Band of Indians v.

FN- 8

Kings County, No. 74-1565, Slip op. at 7-8, 11-13 (CA 9, Nov. 3,
1975); Goldberg, supra note _ _ , Note, The extension of County
Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians in California: Public Law 280
and the Ninth Circuit, 25 Hastings L. J. 1451 ( 1974); Comment, Indian
Taxation:

Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59 Calif. L.

Rev. 1261 ( 1971).

The suggestio.1,1 is that, since tribal governments

are disabled under many state laws from incorporating as local units
of government, Goldberg, supra, at 581, general regulatory control
might relegate tribal governments to a level below that of counties and
municipalities, thus essentially destroying them, particularly if they
might raise revenue only after the tax base had been filtered through
many governmental layers of taxation.

Present federal policy appears

.•

to be returning to a focus upon strengthening tribal self-government.
See,

~·,

§ § 1451 et

Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U.S. C.
~·;

Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance

Act of 1975, 88 Stat. 2203, 25 U.S. C. § § 450 et

~·,

and the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has expressed the view that ~:z!E&:tl1EDB

D Z131 courts ''are not obligated in ambiguous circumstances to strain

.•

to implement a policy Congress has now rejected, particularly where
to do so will interfere with the present congressional approach to what
is, after all, an ongoing relationship.
Kings County, supra, Slip op., at 12.

11

Santa Rosa Band of Indians v.
.•

,.

I

..•·~

,,
.J

't·
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)2_/

......

See also, Note, The Extension of County Jurisdiction over
Indian Reservations in California: Public Law 280 and the Ninth

..

Circuit, 25 Hastings L. J. 1451, 1489 (1974).

--,,

]j_/
68 Stat. 718, 25 U.S. C. § 564 (Klamath Tribe); 68 Stat.
768, 25 U.S. C. § § 721-728 (Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas);
68 Stat. 1099, 25 U.S. C. §§ 741-760 (Paiute Indians of Utah); 68 Stat.
250, 25 U.S. C. § § 891-901 (Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin).

t'•'·

l]_/
Congress would be fully justified in 1953 in being uncertain
as to state power to levy a personal property tax on reservation
Indians.

No decision of this Court directly resolved the is sue until

Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
decided earlier this Term..

u.s.

__

,

It appears that the only decision of this
·''

Court prior to 1953 dealing with state power to levy a personal property
tax on reservation Indians was United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432,
443-444 (1902), a case which held exempt from state taxation persona l
Indian property purchased with federal funds.
of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 865 ( 1958).
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I think Brennan's
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I prefer, although I am not persuaded by some of his individual
arguments.
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It seems to me most important that the statute

is too ambiguous to override the

~R

general rule of nontaxation

when there is no legislative history indicating that Congress
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On the other hand, each of the specific statutory text
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~
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